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Abstract
The protection of user privacy is an important concern in ma-
chine learning, as evidenced by the rolling out of the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union
(EU) in May 2018. The GDPR is designed to give users more
control over their personal data, which motivates us to ex-
plore machine learning frameworks with data sharing with-
out violating user privacy. To meet this goal, in this paper, we
propose a novel lossless privacy-preserving tree-boosting sys-
tem known as SecureBoost in the setting of federated learn-
ing. This federated-learning system allows a learning process
to be jointly conducted over multiple parties with partially
common user samples but different feature sets, which corre-
sponds to a vertically partitioned virtual data set. An advan-
tage of SecureBoost is that it provides the same level of accu-
racy as the non privacy-preserving approach while at the same
time, reveal no information of each private data provider.
We theoretically prove that the SecureBoost framework is as
accurate as other non-federated gradient tree-boosting algo-
rithms that bring the data into one place. In addition, along
with a proof of security, we discuss what would be required
to make the protocols completely secure.
Introduction
The modern society is increasingly concerned with the
unlawful use and exploitation of our personal data. At
the individual level, improper use of personal data may
cause potential risk to user privacy. At the enterprise level,
data leakage may impinge have grave consequences on
commercial interests. Actions are being taken by different
societies. For example, the European Union has recently
enacted a low known as General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR). The GDPR is designed to give users
more control over their personal data (Regulation 2016;
Albrecht 2016; Mayer-Schonberger and Padova 2015;
Goodman and Flaxman 2016). Many enterprises that
rely heavily on machine learning are beginning to make
sweeping changes as a consequence.
Despite difficulty in meeting the goal of user privacy pro-
tection, the need for different organizations to collaborate
while building machine-learning models still stay strong. In
reality, many data owners do not have a sufficient amount of
data to build high-quality models. For example, retail com-
panies have user transactions data, which correspond to dif-
ferent data dimensions or features as credit-rating compa-
nies do. Likewise, mobile phone users have their usage data,
but each device only have a small amount of user-activity
data. To have a usable model for user preference prediction,
it would be necessary to integrate the data collected by the
clients.
Thus, it is a challenge to both allow different data own-
ers to collaborate together in order to build high-quality
machine learning models while at the same time, pro-
tect user data privacy and confidentiality. In the past,
several attempts have been made to address the user-
privacy problem while exchanging data (Hardy et al. 2017;
Mohassel and Zhang 2017). For example, Apple proposed
to use differential privacy (Dwork, Roth, and others 2014;
Dwork 2008) to address the privacy preservation issue. The
basic idea of differential privacy (DP) is to add properly cal-
ibrated noise to data to disambiguate the identity of any in-
dividuals when the data is being exchanged and analyzed
by a third party. However, as we discuss in the paper, DP
only prevent user-data leakage to a certain degree and can-
not completely rule out the identity of an individual. In ad-
dition, data exchange under the DP still requires that the
data changes hands between organizations, which may not
be allowed by strict laws like GDPR. Furthermore, the DP
method is lossy in machine learning in that models built after
noise is injected can reduce much performance in prediction
accuracy.
More recently, Google introduces a federated learning
framework (Konecˇny` et al. 2016) on its Android cloud. The
basic idea is to allow individual clients to encrypt their
models which are then uploaded and aggregated at a cen-
tral cloud site. The machine-learning process at that site
can make use of these encrypted models while not leaking
the clients’ information. This framework applies to a data-
partition framework where each partition corresponds to a
subset of data samples collected from one or more users.
In this paper, we consider a general setting of multiple
parties collaboratively build their machine-learning models
while protecting user privacy and data confidentiality. Our
setting is as shown in Figure 2. We consider a collection of
parties each holding a part of its own data. We can visualize
the data located at different parties as a subsection of a big
data table that is obtained by taking the union of all data at
different parties. Then the data at each party has the follow-
ing property:
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed SecureBoost framework
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Figure 2: Vertically partitioned data set
1. The big data table is vertically split, such that the data are
split in the feature dimension among parties;
2. only one data providers has the label information;
3. the users have partial overlap across different parties.
Our goal is then to allow each party to build a prediction
model for some designated label, while disallow any party
to obtain any information on the data of other parties.
Our above setting have several advantages. In contrast
with most existing work on privacy-preserving data mining
and machine learning, the complexity in our setting is sig-
nificantly increased. Unlike the situation where the data are
horizontally split, the above setting requires a more complex
mechanism to decompose the loss function at each party
(Vaidya 2008; Vaidya and Clifton 2005; Hardy et al. 2017).
In addition, in each model-building process for all parties,
only one data provider owns the label information. It re-
quires us to propose a secure protocol to guide the learn-
ing process instead of sharing label information explicitly
among all parties. Finally, data confidentiality and privacy
concerns prevents the parties to expose their own users who
are not common among the group when building the mod-
els. Hence, entity alignment should also be conducted in a
sufficiently secure manner.
In this paper, we propose a novel end-to-end privacy-
preserving tree-boosting algorithm and framework known
as SecureBoost to enable machine learning in a feder-
ated setting. Unlike previous federated learning frameworks
that split the data on user dimensions, our framework en-
sures that collaborative model building is done when data
is split among different parties on the feature dimension.
Our federated learning framework operates in two steps.
First, we find the common users among the parties under
a privacy-preserving constraint. Then, we collaboratively
learn a shared classification or regression model without
leaking any user information to each other. We summarize
our main contributions as follows:
• We formally define a novel problem of privacy-preserving
machine learning over vertically partitioned data in the
setting of federated learning.
• We present an approach to train a high-quality tree boost-
ing model for each party collaborativelywhile keeping the
training data secret over multiple parties. We go through
this machine learning process without the participation of
a trusted third party.
• Finally and importantly, we prove that our approach is
lossless in the sense that it is as accurate as any central-
ized non-privacy-preservingmethods that bring all data to
a central location.
• In addition, along with a proof of security, we discuss
what would be required to make the protocols completely
secure.
Preliminaries and Related Work
The existing literature on privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing broadly address two objectives: privacy of the data
used for learning a model or as input to an existing
model. To protect privacy of the data used for learning a
model, in (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015; Abadi et al. 2016),
the authors propose to take advantage of differential pri-
vacy for learning a deep learning model. As one of the
most popular privacy-preserving techniques, differential pri-
vacy (Dwork 2008) protects sensitive data by injecting noise
to the raw datasets such that the amount of information
leaked from an individual record is minimized. Even though
differential privacy ensures a pretty low probability of iden-
tifying an individual record, there’s still a probability of
leakage, which is against the requirement of GDPR. To ad-
dress the above problems, Google introduces a federated
learning framework to bring the model training to each
mobile terminal (Konecˇny` et al. 2016). It achieves the goal
of privacy protection by forbidding the data from trans-
ferring out. Another privacy preserving techniques is fo-
cuses on the inference stage instead of training stage. Mi-
crosoft proposed a cryptographic deep learning framework,
CryptoNets (Gilad-Bachrach et al. 2016) based on Homo-
morphic Encryption to enable a trained neural network to
make encrypted predictions over the encrypted data. How-
ever, it has to sacrifice the accuracy to obtain security.
In (Rouhani, Riazi, and Koushanfar 2017), another frame-
work DeepSecure is proposed to securely conduct deep
learning execution on encrypted data using Yao’s Garbled
Circuit (GC) protocol. Although it does not involve a trade-
off between utility and privacy, it suffers from serious inef-
ficiency.
All the above methods are designed for horizontally par-
titioned data whose data providers record the same features
for different entities. We consider a vertical data partition
as shown in Figure 2, in which multiple parties record dif-
ferent features at different sites. Different from the hori-
zontal partitioning, which assumes that ensemble happens
over data samples, the vertical partition builds a model
over a common set of users. How to collaboratively build
the model is an open question. Some previous works dis-
cuss privacy-preserving decision trees over vertically par-
titioned data (Vaidya and Clifton 2005; Vaidya et al. 2008).
However, their proposed methods have to reveal class dis-
tribution over the given attributes, which will cause po-
tential security risk. In addition, they can only handle dis-
crete data, which is less practical for real-life scenario.
In contrast, our method guarantees more secure protection
to the data and can easily apply to continuous data. In
(Djatmiko et al. 2017), Patrini et al. proposed a framework
to jointly perform logistic regression over the encrypted
vertically-partitioned data by approximating a non-linear lo-
gistic loss by a Taylor expansion. Clearly, in this approxima-
tion, the algorithm will inevitably cause a loss of accuracy.
To the contrary, we propose a novel approach that is loss-
less in nature. We believe that the SecureBoost framework
is the first attempt for privacy-preserving federated learning
over vertically partitioned data which balance accuracy and
security.
Problem Statement
We now formally define our problem and clarify the
difference between our setting and previous works. Let{
Xk ∈ Rnk×dk
}m
k=1
be the data matrix distributed on m
private parties with each row Xki∗ ∈ R
1×dk being a data
instance. We use Fk = {f1, ..., fdk} to denote the feature
set of corresponding data matrixXk. If we consider all data
come from a virtual big data table involving all users and all
features, then we can view the data as being vertically split
from a large virtual table across different parties, such that
each party holds a different set of vertically partitioned data
over a subset of users. Two parties p and q have different sets
of features, denoted as Fp ∩ Fq = ∅, ∀p 6= q ∈ {1...m}.
Different data providers may hold different sets of users as
well, allowing some degree of overlap. That is, parties at
sites n1...nm may be different from each other. As men-
tioned before, when building a model for a common task,
we consider that only one of the data providers has a class
attribute for classification or regression. We denote the class
label as y ∈ Rnk×1 where the class label is held by the k-th
party.
Definition 1. Active Party:
We define the active party as the data provider who holds
both a data matrix and the class label.
Since the class label information is indispensable for su-
pervised learning, there must be an active party with access
to the label y. The active party naturally takes the responsi-
bility as a dominating server in federated learning.
Definition 2. Passive Party:
We define the data provider which has only a data matrix
as a passive party.
Passive parties play the role of clients in the federated
learning setting. They are also in need of building a model to
predict the class label y for their prediction purposes. Thus
they must collaborate with the active party to build their
model to predict y for their future users using their own fea-
tures.
The problem of privacy-preservingmachine learning over
vertically partitioned data in federated learning can be stated
as follows:
Given: a vertically partitioned data matrix
{
Xk
}m
k=1
dis-
tributed on m private parties and the class labels y dis-
tributed on active party.
Learn: a machine learning model M without giving in-
formation of the data matrix of any parties to others in the
process. The modelM is a function that has a projectionMi
at each party i, such that Mi takes input of its own features
Xi.
Lossless Constraint: We require that the model M is
lossless, which means that the loss of M under federated
learning over the training data is the same as the loss ofM ′
whenM ′ is built on the union of all data.
Federated Learning with SecureBoost
As one of the most widely-used machine-
learning algorithms, the gradient-tree boosting
model (Friedman et al. 2000) excels in many machine learn-
ing tasks, such as fraud detection (Oentaryo et al. 2014),
feature selection (Li et al. 2017) and product recommen-
dation (He et al. 2014). In this section, we propose a novel
gradient-tree boosting algorithm we call SecureBoost in
the setting of federated learning. As shown in Figure 1,
SecureBoost consists of two major steps. First, it aligns the
data under the privacy constraint. Second, it collaboratively
learn a shared gradient-tree boosting model while keeping
all the training data secret over multiple private parties.
Below, we explain each part in turn.
Our first goal is to find a common set of data samples
at all participating parties so as to build a joint model M .
When the data is vertically partitioned over multiple par-
ties, different parties hold different but partially overlapped
users. These users may be identified by their unique user
IDs. A problem is how to find the common shared users
or data samples across the parties without compromising
the non-shared parts of the user sets. In particular, we
align the data samples under an encryption scheme by using
the privacy-preserving protocol for inter-database intersec-
tions (Liang and Chawathe 2004).
After aligning the data across different parties under the
privacy constraint, we now consider the problem of jointly
building tree ensemble model over multiple parties without
violating privacy in federated learning. Before further dis-
cussing the detail of the algorithm, we first introduce a gen-
eral framework of federated learning. In federated learning,
a typical interation consists of four steps. At first, each client
downloads the current global model from server. Next, each
client computes an updated model based on its local data
and the current global model, which resides with the active
party. Third, each client sends the model update back to the
server under encryption. Finally, the server aggregates these
model updates and construct the improved global model.
Following the general framework of federated learning,
we can see that to achieve a privacy-preserving tree boosting
framework in the setting of federated learning, in essence,
we have to answer the following three questions: (1) How
can each client (i.e., a passive party) compute an updated
model based on its local data without reference to class la-
bel? (2) How can the server (i.e., the active party) aggre-
gate all the updated model and obtain a new global model?
(3) How to share the updated global model among all par-
ties without leaking any information at inference time? To
answer these three questions, we start by reviewing a tree
ensemble model, XGBoost (Chen and Guestrin 2016), in a
non-federated setting.
Given a data setX ∈ Rn×d with n samples and d features,
XGBoost predicts the output by usingK regression trees.
yˆi =
K∑
k=1
fk(xi) (1)
To learn the set of regression tree models used in Eq.(1),
it greedily adds a tree ft at the t-th iteration to minimize the
following loss.
L(t) ≃
n∑
i=1
[l(yi, yˆi
(t−1)) + gift(xi) +
1
2
hif
2
t (xi)] + Ω(ft)
(2)
where Ω(ft) = γT +
1
2λ ‖w‖
2
, gi = ∂yˆ(t−1) l(yi, yˆ
(t−1))
and hi = ∂
2
yˆ(t−1)
l(yi, yˆ
(t−1)).
When construct the regression tree in the t-th iteration,
it starts from the tree with the depth of 0 and add a split
for each leaf nodes of the tree until reaching the maximum
depth. In particular, it employs the following equation to de-
termine the best split.
Lsplit =
1
2
[
(
∑
i∈IL
gi)
2
∑
i∈IL
hi + λ
+
(
∑
i∈IR
gi)
2
∑
i∈IR
hi + λ
−
(
∑
i∈I gi)
2
∑
i∈I hi + λ
]−γ
(3)
In the above equation, IL and IR are the instance spaces of
left and right tree nodes after the split. The split that maxi-
mizes the score is selected as the best split.
When it obtains an optimal tree structure, the optimal
weight w∗j of leaf j can be computed by the following equa-
tion:
w∗j = −
∑
i∈Ij
gi∑
i∈Ij
hi + λ
(4)
where Ij is the instance space of leaf j.
From the above review, we make following observations:
(1) The evaluation of split candidates and the calculation
of the optimal weight of leaf only depend on the gi and hi.
(2) The class label is needed for the calculation of gi
and hi. For instance, when we take the logistic loss as the
loss function, we have gi = −yi(1 −
1
1+e−y
(t−1)
i
) + (1 −
yi)
1
1+e−y
(t−1)
i
and hi =
e
−y
(t−1)
i
(1+e−y
(t−1)
i )2
. Hence, it is easy to
recover the class label from gi and hi once we obtain the
value of y
(t−1)
i .
With the guidance of the above observations, we now
discuss how to adapt a non-federated gradient boosted tree
model to a federated learning setting. Following observation
(1), we can see that each passive party can determine the
locally optimal split independently with only its local data
once it obtains gi and hi. Thus, a naive solution is requir-
ing the active party to send gi and hi to each passive party.
However, according to observation (2), gi and hi should be
regarded as sensitive data as well, since they can be used to
discover the class label information. To ensure security, pas-
sive parties cannot get access to gi and hi directly. In order
to keep gi and hi confidential, we require the active party to
encrypt gi and hi before sending them to passive parties. The
remaining challenge is how to determine the locally optimal
split with encrypted gi and hi for each passive party.
According to Eq.(5), the optimal split can be found if
gl =
∑
i∈IL
gi and hl =
∑
i∈IL
hi can be calculated for
every possible splits, where IL is the instance space of left
nodes after the split. Next, we show how to obtain gl and
hl with encrypted gi and hi using additively homomorphic
encryption scheme (Paillier 1999).
First, we define the encryption of a number u under ad-
ditively homomorphic encryption scheme as 〈u〉. Recalling
the main properties of additively homomorphic encryption
scheme, for any two numbers u and v, we have 〈u〉+ 〈v〉 =
〈u+ v〉. Therefore, 〈hl〉 is equivalent to
∑
i∈IL
〈hi〉 and
similarly, 〈gl〉 can be computed by
∑
i∈IL
〈gi〉. By taking
advantage of additively homomorphic encryption scheme,
the best split can be found in the following way. First, each
passive party computes 〈gl〉 and 〈hl〉 for all possible splits
locally. It then sends the values back to the active party. Af-
ter collecting the values from all passive parties, the active
party deciphers 〈gl〉 and 〈hl〉 and calculates the global op-
Algorithm 1 Aggregate Encrypted Gradient Statistics
Input: I, instance space of current node
Input: d, feature dimension
Input: {〈gi〉 , 〈hi〉}i∈I
Output: G ∈ Rd×l,H ∈ Rd×l
1: for k = 0→ d do
2: Propose Sk = {sk1, sk2, ..., skl} by percentiles on
feature k
3: end for
4: for k = 0→ d do
5: Gkv =
∑
i∈{i|sk,v≥xi,k>sk,v−1}
〈gi〉
6: Hkv =
∑
i∈{i|sk,v≥xi,k>sk,v−1}
〈hi〉
7: end for
timal split according to Eq.(5). In this case, the communi-
cation cost between the active and each passive parties is
2 ∗ n ∗ d ∗ ct for a single split. Here, ct denotes the size of
ciphertext, n represents the number of instances associated
with the node to be split and d is the number of features held
by the passive party.
We can observe that this solution is not efficient since it
requires the transfer of 〈gl〉 and 〈hl〉 for all possible split
candidates. To construct the tree with lower communication
cost, we take advantage of an approximate framework pro-
posed by (Chen and Guestrin 2016), where the detailed cal-
culation is shown in Algorithm 1. For each passive party,
instead of computing 〈gl〉 and 〈hl〉 directly, it maps the fea-
tures into buckets and then aggregates the encrypted gradi-
ent statistics based on the buckets. In this way, the active
party only needs to collect the aggregated encrypted gradi-
ent statistics from all passive parties. As a result, it can deter-
mine the globally optimal split as described in Algorithm 2.
In this case, the communication cost for constructing a re-
gression tree can be reduced to 2 ∗ (n/q) ∗ d ∗ ct where
q denotes the number of instances in one bucket. Clearly,
we have (1/q) << 1. Therefore, we can indeed decrease
the communication cost. After the active party obtains the
global optimal split, [party id (i), feature id (k), threshold id
(v)], it returns the feature id k and threshold id v to the corre-
sponding passive party i. Passive party i decides the selected
attribute’s value based on the value of k and v. Then, it par-
titions the current instance space according to the selected
attribute’s value. In addition, it builds a lookup table locally
to record the selected attribute’s value, [feature, threshold
value], as shown in Figure 3. After that, it returns the in-
dex of the record and the instance space of left nodes after
the split (IL) back to the active party. The active party splits
the current node according to the received instance space
and associate current node with [party id, record id], until a
stopping criterion or the max depth is reached. All the leaf
nodes are stored inside the active party.
Federated Inference based on the Learned Model
In this section, we describe how to use the learned model
(distributed among parties) to classify a new instance even
though the features of the instance to be classified are private
and distributed among parties. Since each site knows the its
Algorithm 2 Split Finding
Input: I, instance space of current node
Input:
{
Gi,Hi
}m
i=1
, aggregated encrypted gradient statis-
tics fromm parties
Output: Partition current instance space according to the
selected attribute’s value
1: /*Conduct on Active Party*/
2: g ←
∑
i∈I gi, h←
∑
i∈I hi
3: //enumerate all parties
4: for i = 0→ m do
5: //enumerate all features
6: for k = 0→ di do
7: gl ← 0, hl ← 0
8: //enumerate all threshold value
9: for v = 0→ lk do
10: get decrypted valuesD(Gikv) andD(H
i
kv)
11: gl ← gl +D(G
i
kv), hl ← hl +D(H
i
kv)
12: gr ← g − gl, hr ← h− hl
13: score← max(score,
g2l
hl+λ
+
g2r
hr+λ
− g
2
h+λ)
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
return kopt and vopt to the corresponding passive
party i when we obtain the max score.
/*Conduct on Passive Party i*/
determine the selected attribute’s value according
to kopt and vopt and partition current instance space.
record the selected attribute’s value and return
[record id, IL] back to the active party.
/*Conduct on Active Party*/
split current node according to IL and associate
current node with [party id, record id].
own features (and can thus evaluate the branch), but knows
nothing of the others, we need a secure distributed proto-
col to control passes from site to site, based on the decision
made.
To illustrate the inference process, we consider a a sys-
tem with three parties as depicted in Figure 3. Specifically,
party 1 is the active party, which collects information about
user’s monthly bill payment and level of education, as well
as the label information. Party 2 and party 3 are passive par-
ties, which hold the features, [age, gender,marriage status]
and [amount of given credit] respectively. Suppose we wish
to know if a user X6 would make payment on time. All
sites have to collaborate to make the prediction. The whole
process is coordinated by the active party. Starting from the
root, by referring to the record [party id:1, record id:1], the
active party knows party 1 holds the root node. Thereby, it
requires party 1 to retrieve the corresponding attribute, Bill
Payment, from its lookup table based on the record id 1.
Since the classifying attribute is bill payment and party 1
knows the bill payment for user X6 is 4367, which is less
than the threshold value 5000, it makes the decision that it
shouldmove down to its left child, node 1. Then, active party
refers to the record [party id:3, record id:1] associated with
node 1 and requires party 3 to conduct the same operations.
This process continues until a leaf is reached.
Theoretical Assessment for Lossless Property
Theorem 1. SecureBoost is lossless as defined in Section
Problem Statement, provided that the modelM andM ′ have
the same initialization and parameters.
Proof. The loss of the model M under the setting of fed-
erated learning is the same as the loss of M ′ when M ′ is
built on the union of all data, becauseM ′ andM ′ are iden-
tical. According to Eq.(5), gi and hi is the only informa-
tion needed for the calculation of best split. Provided that
with the same initialization, each iteration, each instance has
the same value of gi and hi under both settings, model M
and M ′ can always achieve the same best split during the
construction of the tree. Thereby,M ′ and M ′ are identical,
which ensures the property of lossless.
Security Discussion
In this section, we discuss the security of our proposed Se-
cureBoost framework. In particular, we will provide detailed
analysis of information leakage of the framework and dis-
cuss the security of our framework in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries. In addition, along with a proof of secu-
rity, we discuss what would be required to make the proto-
cols completely secure.
Analysis of Information Leakage
As SecureBoost consists of two components, we discussion
information leakage of these two component respectively.
During privacy-preserving entity alignment, the encryp-
tion techniques guarantees that nothing reveals but the ID
of the common shared users across the parties. Although re-
vealing ID of the common shared users might cause some
potential risk, these level of leakage is acceptable in most
scenarios.
For the construction of the tree ensemble model, all that is
revealed contains: (1) Each party knows instance space for
the each split; (2) Each party knows the tree nodes held by
itself; (3) Active party knows the number of features held by
each passive parties; (4) Active party knows the actual value
of gl and hl; (5) Active party knowswhich site is responsible
for the decision made at each node. Considering a system
with one passive party and one active party, we now discuss
the potential security risk caused by the leaked information.
First, we study how much information the passive parties
can learn about active party. As we know, SecureBoost es-
sentially is a decision tree model. Although its leaf nodes
do not hold a class label, instances associated with the same
leaf still strongly indicates that they may belong to the same
class or result in similar regression results. Thereby, in Se-
cureBoost, we require leaf nodes to be unknown to passive
party in order to prevent the label information from disclo-
sure. However, such protection is not enough to guarantee
the security. Let us consider the situation that a passive party
holds the parent node of two leaf nodes. In this case, the in-
stances space of those leaf nodes is no longer hidden from
passive party. Passive party can make a guess that all in-
stances associated with the same leaf belong to the same
class. The confidence of the inference is determined by leaf
purity where leaf purity refers to the proportion of samples
which belong to the majority class. Thus, we take leaf purity
as metrics to give a quantitative information leakage analy-
sis to SecureBoost. More precisely, we consider the scenario
of binary classification for the reason that it will potentially
cause the greatest security risk.
According to Eq.( 2), to learn the SecureBoost model, we
greedily add a decision tree ft at the t-th iteration to fitting
residual yi − yˆi
(t−1)
. Therefore, when t > 1, the instances
associated with the same leaf only indicate that they may
have similar residual, which cannot directly used to infer the
label information. However, when t = 1, f1 try to fit the
label yi. In this case, the instance space of the leaf nodesmay
reveal the label information. Thereby, our security concern
mainly focus on how much information we can infer from
the first tree, f1. Let’s start our analysis with Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For a learned SecureBoost model, the informa-
tion leakage is given by the weight of the first tree’s leaves.
Proof. The loss function for binary classification problem is
shown as follows.
L = yilog(1 + e
−yˆi) + (1− yi)log(1 + e
yˆi) (5)
Based on the loss function, we have gi = yˆi
(0) − yi and
hi = yˆi
(0) ∗ (1 − yˆi
(0)) during the construction of the de-
cision tree at first iteration. Specifically, yˆi
(0) is given as
initialized value. Suppose we initialize all yˆi
(0) as a where
0 < a < 1. According to Eq.( 4), for the instances associated
with the specific leaf j, yˆi
(1) = S(w∗j ) = S(−
∑
i∈Ij
gi
∑
i∈Ij
hi+λ
)
where S(x) is the sigmoid function. Suppose the number of
instances associated with the leaf j is nj and the percent-
age of positive samples is θj . When nj is relatively big,
we can ignore λ. Therefore, we have w∗j = −
∑
i∈Ij
gi
∑
i∈Ij
hi
=
− θ∗n∗(a−1)+(1−θ)∗n∗a
n∗a∗(1−a) = −
θ∗n∗(a−1)+(1−θ)∗n∗a
n∗a∗(1−a) =
a−θ
a(a−1)
Noticemax(θ, 1−θ) is the leaf purify of leaf j. In another
word, given a learned SecureBoost model, the information
leakage can be inferred from the weight of the first tree’s
leaves.
According to Theorem 2, as long as weight of the first
tree’s leaves are close enough to S( 2a−12a(a−1) ), the protocol is
considered secure.
Second, we focus on whether the active party can learn
about private information of passive party. Specifically, we
have security concern that if active party can recover portion
of features held by passive parties with some confidence.
During training, active party learns (1) instance space for
the each split; (2) tree nodes held by itself; (3) the number
of features held by each passive parties; (4) the actual value
of gl and hl; (5) which site is responsible for the decision
made at each node. To recover the features, active party has
to learn partial order relation among all instances regarding
to a specific feature. However, the only information it knows
Example BIll Payment Education 
X1 3102 2 
X2 17250 3 
X3 14027 2 
X4 6787 1 
X5 280 1 
Party 1 (Passive Party) 
Example Age Gender Marriage Label 
X1 20 1 0 0 
X2 30 1 1 1 
X3 35 0 1 1 
X4 48 0 1 2 
X5 10 1 0 3 
Party 2 (Active Party) 
Example Amount of given credit 
X1 5000 
X2 300000 
X3 250000 
X4 300000 
X5 200 
Party 3 (Passive Party) 
w1 w3 w4
Party ID:2
Record ID:1
Party ID:3
Record ID:1
Party ID: 1
Record ID: 1
Root 
Node 1 Node 2 
Example BIll Payment Education 
X6 4367 2 
Example Age Gender Marriage Label 
X6 28 1 0 0 
Example Amount of given credit 
X6 5500 
Training Set 
Predict 
{X5} {X1} {X2, X3} {X4}
w2
input 
ĸ Party 1: 4367<5000 
Ĺ Party 3 query for ‘1' 
from its lookup table 
ĺ Party 3: 5500>800 
ķ Party 1 query for ‘1' 
from its lookup table 
Lookup table 
Party 1: 
Party 2: 
Party 3: 
Record ID Feature threshold value 
1 Bill Payment  5000 
Record ID Feature threshold value 
1 Age 40 
Record ID Feature threshold value 
1 Amount of given credit 800 
Figure 3: An illustration of prediction.
is how best splits partition the instance space, which is obvi-
ous not enough to learn the partial order relation.
Generally speaking, the level of information leakage for
SecureBoost is acceptable based on our analysis.
Semi-Honest Security
In this subsection, we would like to discuss security of our
framework under the semi-honest assumption. In our secu-
rity definition, all parties are honest-but-curious. Some cor-
rupt parties might cooperate with each other in order to
gather private information. Specifically, we require active
party does not collude with any passive party. We now prove
that Secureboost is secure under the security definition.
Proof. Our SecureBoost system can be split into two parts,
the first part includes only active party and the second part
includes all passive parties. When all passive parties collude,
the system is equal to a system with one active party and one
super passive party. This super passive party holds all feature
from passive parties. As discussed in Section Analysis of
Information Leakage, we have proved that when our system
has only one active party and one passive party, the level of
information leakage is acceptable. Therefore, our system is
secure under the semi-honest assumption.
Completely SecureBoost
As discussed in Section Analysis of Information Leakage,
our main security concern is that instance space for leaf
nodes may reveal too much information and the passive
party indeed has chance to know instance space for the
leaf nodes when collaboratively construct the tree ensem-
ble model with the active party. To alleviate this problem,
we proposed Completely SecureBoost to prevent the passive
party from constructing the first tree. Unlike SecureBoost,
the active party of Completely SecureBoost learns the first
tree independently based on its own features, rather than col-
laborate with passive parties. Thereby, the instance space of
the leaf nodes of the first tree can be protected. In this case,
all that passive party can learn is the residuals. Although we
intuitively illustrate that residuals won’t reveal much infor-
mation once the first tree get protected, to make it more plau-
sible, we now give a theoretical proof as presented in Theo-
rem 3.
Theorem 3. The residuals of the tree won’t reveal much in-
formation when leaf purity of the previous tree is high.
Proof. As mentioned before, for binary classification prob-
lem, we have gi = yˆi
(t−1) − yi and hi = yˆi
(t−1) ∗ (1 −
yˆi
(t−1)), where gi ∈ [−1, 1]. Hence,
if yi = 0, hi = gi(1− gi)
if yi = 1, hi = −gi(gi + 1)
(6)
When we construct the decision tree at the t-th iteration
with k leaves to fit the residuals of the previous tree, in es-
sential, we split the data into k clusters to minimize the fol-
lowing loss.
L =−
k∑
j=1
(
∑
i∈Ij
gi)
2
∑
i∈Ij
hi
=−
k∑
j=1
(
∑
i∈Ij
gi)
2
∑
i∈INj
gi(1− gi) +
∑
i∈IPj
−gi(1 + gi)
(7)
We know yˆi
(t−1) ∈ [0, 1] and gi = yˆi
(t−1) − yi. Thus,
we have gi ∈ [−1, 0] for positive samples and gi ∈ [0, 1] for
negative samples. Taking the range of gi into consideration,
we rewrite the above equation as follows.
k∑
j=1
(
∑
i∈IN
j
|gi| −
∑
i∈IP
j
|gi|)
2
∑
i∈INj
|gi|(|gi| − 1) +
∑
i∈IPj
|gi|(|gi| − 1)
(8)
Where INj and I
P
j denote the set of negative samples and
positive samples associated with leaf j respectively. We de-
note the expectation of |gi| for positive samples as µp and
the expectation of |gi| for negative samples as µn. When we
have a large amount of samples but small number of leave
nodes k, we can use the following equation to approximates
Eq.( 8).
k∑
j=1
(nnj µn − n
p
jµp)
2
nnj µn(µn − 1) + n
p
jµp(µp − 1)
(9)
Where nnj and n
p
j represent the number of negative sam-
ples and positive samples associated with leaf j. Since
µn ∈ [0, 1] and µn ∈ [0, 1], we know the numerator
has to be positive and the denominator has to be nega-
tive. Thus, the whole equation has to be negative. To min-
imize Eq.(9) is equal to maximizing the numerator while
minimizing the denominator. Notice that the denominator
is
∑
x2 and the numerator is (
∑
x)2 where x ∈ [0, 1] .
The equation is dominated by numerator. Thereby, minimiz-
ing Eq.( 9) can be regarded as maximizing the numerator
(nnj µn − n
p
jµp)
2. Ideally, we require nnj = n
p
j in order to
prevent label information from divulging. When |µn − µp|
is bigger, more possible we can achieve the goal. And we
know |gi| = |yˆi
(t−1) − yi| = yˆi
(t−1)
for negative sam-
ples and |gi| = |yˆi
(t−1) − yi| = 1 − yˆi
(t−1) for positive
samples. Thereby, µn =
1
Nn
∑k
j=1(1 − θj)nj yˆi
(t−1)
and
µp =
1
Np
∑k
j=1 θjnj(1 − yˆi
(t−1)). |µn − µp| can be calcu-
lated as follows.
|µn − µp|
=|
1
Nn
k∑
j=1
(1− θj)nj yˆi
(t−1) −
1
Np
k∑
j=1
θjnj(1− yˆi
(t−1))|
(10)
Where Nn and Np correspond to the number of negative
samples and positive samples in total. θj is the percentage
of positive samples associated with leave j for decision tree
at (t− 1)-th iteration (previous decision tree). nj denote the
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Figure 4: Loss convergence
number of instances associated with leave j for previous de-
cision tree. yˆi
(t−1) = S(wj)wherewj represents the weight
of j-th leave of previous decision tree. When the positive
samples and negative samples are balanced, Nn = Np, we
have
|µn − µp|
=
1
Nn
|
k∑
j=1
((1 − θj)njS(wj)− θjnj(1− S(wj))|
=
1
Nn
k∑
j=1
nj |(S(wj)− θj)|
=
1
Nn
k∑
j=1
nj |(S(
a− θj
a(a− 1)
)− θj)|
(11)
As observed from Eq.( 11), it achieves the minimumvalue
when S(
a−θj
a(a−1) ) = a. By solving the equation, we have the
optimal solution of θj as θj∗ = a(1 + (1 − a) ln(
a
1−a ))).
In order to achieve bigger µn − µp, we want the deviation
from θj to θj∗ to be as big as possible. When we have proper
initialization of a, for instance a = 0.5, θj∗ = 0.5. In this
case, maximizing |θj − θj ∗ | is the same as maximizing
max(θj , 1− θj), which exactly is the leaf purity. Therefore,
we have proved that high leaf purity will guarantee big dif-
ference between µn and µp, which finally results in less in-
formation leakage. We complete our proof.
Given Theorem 3, we can conclude that Completely Se-
cureBoost is secure when its first tree learn enough informa-
tion to mask the actual label with residuals.
Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments on two public
datasets. The summary of these datasets is shown as follows.
Credit 11: It involves the problem of classifying whether
a user would suffer from serious financial problems. It con-
tains a total of 150000 instances and 10 attributes.
Credit 22: It is also a credit scoring dataset, which is cor-
related to the task of predicting whether a user would make
payment on time. It consist of 30000 instances and 25 at-
tributes in all.
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/GiveMeSomeCredit/data
2https://www.kaggle.com/uciml/default-of-credit-card-clients-
dataset
Table 1: Runtime for Entity Alignment
# samples A
# samples B
1K 10K 100K 1M
1K 0.758570 3.1834986 47.849709 480.712245
10K 5.278931 9.650333 53.428195 484.582641
100K 53.032154 54.919945 97.323001 547.061498
1M 529.684710 532.306558 584.671372 1021.334617
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Figure 5: Scalability Analysis of Secure Federated Tree Boosting System
In our experiment, we use 2/3 of the datasets for training
and the remained for testing. We split the data vertically into
two halves and distribute them to two parties. To fairly com-
pare different methods, we set the maximum depth of indi-
vidual regression tree as 3, the fraction of samples to be used
for fitting the individual regression trees as 0.8 and learning
rate as 0.3 for all methods. The Paillier encryption scheme
is taken as our additively homomorphic scheme with a key
size of 512 bits. All experiments are conducted on a machine
with 8GB RAM and Intel Core i5− 7200u CPU.
Scalability
As SecureBoost consists of two components, the privacy-
preserving entity alignment and the secure federated tree
boosting system, we study the scalability of each component
separately.
Efficiency of Privacy-Preserving Entity Alignment We
consider a system with only two parties when evaluating the
scalability of privacy-preserving entity alignment algorithm.
The number of samples distributed on parties A and B are
important factors to consider. To investigate the effects of
two factors, we vary the number of samples distributed on
parties A and B on the log-scale from 1K to 1M separately.
We study the effect of each variation by fixing the other to
investigate how the change affects the running time. The re-
sults are shown in the Table 1 with the following observa-
tions.
• In general, the runtime variation w.r.t. the size of samples
distributed on party A has a similar trend as the variation
of the size of samples distributed on party B, which sug-
gests that the number of samples distributed on party A
and B, respectively, contribute equally to running time.
• The running time strongly depends on max(#samples A,
#samples B). When the size of samples distributed on
Table 2: First Tree vs. Second Tree in terms of Leaf Purity
Mean Purity Credit 1 Credit 2
1st tree 0.8058 0.7159
2rd tree 0.66663 0.638
party A is equal to the samples distributed on party B, the
runtime increases almost linearly with the increase of the
size of samples.
• It only takes around 16 minutes of computation time to
align entities when the number of samples distributed on
both parties A and B are 1M , which is fairly efficient.
This observation validates the scalability of our entity
alignment algorithms.
Efficiency of Secure Federated Tree Boosting System
We notice that the effectiveness of secure federated tree
boosting system may be influenced by (1) convergence rate;
(2) maximum depth of the individual regression tree; (3) the
sample size of the datasets; and (4) the feature size of the
datasets. In this subsection, we study the impact of all four
variables on the runtime of learning respectively. All exper-
iments are conducted on dataset Credit 2.
First, we are interested in the convergence rate of our pro-
posed system. We compare the convergence rate of Secure-
Boost with non-federated tree boosting implementation, in-
cluding GBDT3 and XGBoost4. As can be observed from
the Figure 4, SecureBoost shows a similar learning curve
with other non-federated baseline methods on the training
dataset. It performs slightly better than others on the test
3http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
modules/generated/sklearn.ensemble.
GradientBoostingClassifier.html
4https://github.com/dmlc/xgboost
Table 3: SecureBoost vs. Completely SecureBoost in terms of Classification Performance
Accuracy Credit 1 Credit 2
1st Tree of SecureBoost 0.9298 0.7806
1st Tree of Completely SecureBoost 0.9186 0.7793
Overall Performance of SecureBoost 0.9345 0.8180
Overall Performance of Completely SecureBoost 0.9331 0.8179
F1-score Credit 1 Credit 2
1st Tree of SecureBoost 0.012 0
1st Tree of Completely SecureBoost 0 0
Overall Performance of SecureBoost 0.2576 0.4634
Overall Performance of Completely SecureBoost 0.2549 0.4650
AUC Credit 1 Credit 2
1st Tree of SecureBoost 0.7002 0.6381
1st Tree of Completely SecureBoost 0.6912 0.6320
Overall Performance of SecureBoost 0.8461 0.7701
Overall Performance of Completely SecureBoost 0.8423 0.7682
dataset. In addition, we can see that with the increase of
boost stages, both training loss and testing loss drop rapidly
at first. When the boosting stages keep increasing from 10 to
25, the loss does not vary much on both the training dataset
and the test dataset. To sum up, the algorithm performs quite
well in terms of convergence, which is appealing in practice
as it significantly reduces the computational costs.
Next, to investigate how maximum depth of the individ-
ual tree affects the runtime of learning, we vary the max-
imum depth of each individual tree among {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
and record the runtime of one boosting stage. As depicted by
Figure 5 (a), we can see with the increase of the maximum
depth of each individual tree, the runtime increases almost
linearly. This indicates that we can train a relatively deep
tree with comparatively little time, which is very appealing
in practice, especially in the scenario of big data.
Finally, we would like to study the impact of data size
on the scalability of our proposed system. We augment
the feature sets by feature products. As shown in Figure 5
(b) and Figure 5 (c), we investigate the effects of fea-
ture number and sample number, respectively. As depicted
by Figure 5 (b) and Figure 5 (c), to study the effect of
those two variables, we vary the feature number in the
range of {50, 500, 1000, 5000} and the sample number in
{5000, 10000, 30000}. We fix the maximum depth of the in-
dividual regression trees to 3. We compare the runtime of
one boosting stage to investigate how each variant affects the
efficiency of the algorithm. From the result, we make simi-
lar observations on both Figure 5 (b) and Figure 5 (c). The
results imply that sample and feature numbers contribute
equally to running time. In addition, we can see that our pro-
posed framework scales well even with relatively big data.
Performance of Completely SecureBoost
To investigate performance of Completely SecureBoost in
both security and prediction accuracy, specifically, we aim to
answer the following two questions: (1) Does the first tree,
built upon only features held by active party, learns enough
information to mask the actual label by residuals? (2) Does
the Completely SecureBoost suffers from a great loss of per-
formance compared with SecureBoost?
First, we study the performance of Completely Secure-
Boost in security. Following the analysis in Section Anal-
ysis of Information Leakage, we evaluate information leak-
age in terms of leaf purity. As discussed in Theorem 3, we
know that when the first tree of Completely SecureBoost fits
the label information well, the residuals won’t reveal much
label information. Therefore, to verify the security of Com-
pletely SecureBoost, we have to illustrate that the first tree of
Completely SecureBoost indeed masks the actual label well.
We conduct experiments on two real-world datasets, Credit
1 and Credit 2. As shown in Table 2, we compare the mean
leaf purity of the first tree with the second tree. In particular,
the mean leaf purity is the weighted average, which is cal-
culated by
∑k
i=0
ni
n
pi. Here, k represents number of leaves
in total. pi and ni are defined as leaf purity and number of
instances associated with leaf i. n corresponds to number
of instances in total. According to Table 2, the mean leaf
purity decreases significantly from the first tree to the sec-
ond tree on both datasets, which validates the effectiveness
ofCompletely SecureBoost in information protection.More-
over, the mean leaf purity of the second tree is just over 0.6
on both datasets, which is good enough to prevent the label
information from revealing.
Next, to investigate the performance of Completely Se-
cureBoost in prediction accuracy, we compare Completely
SecureBoost with SecureBoost with respect to the the first
tree’s performance and the overall performance. We con-
duct experiments on datasets, Credit 1 and Credit 2. Both
of them involve the task of binary classification. Thus, we
consider the commonly used accuracy, Area under the ROC
curve (AUC) and f1-score as the evaluation metric. All these
three evaluation metric are the higher the better. The results
are presented in Table 3. As can be observed,Completely Se-
cureBoost performs equally well compared to SecureBoost
in almost all cases. We also conduct a pairwise Wilcoxon
signed-rank test between Completely SecureBoost and Se-
cureBoost. The comparison results indicate that Completely
SecureBoost is as accurate as SecureBoost, with a signif-
icance level of 0.05. The property of lossless can still be
guaranteed for Completely SecureBoost.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel lossless privacy-
preserving algorithm, SecureBoost, to train a high-quality
tree boosting model when the training data remains secret
over multiple parties. We theoretically prove that our pro-
posed framework is as accurate as non-federated gradient
tree boosting algorithms that bring all the data into one place
naively. Along with a proof of security, we discuss what
would be required to make the protocols completely secure.
The experimental results show that our proposed Secure-
Boost scales well even with relatively big data.
We believe that the research in federated learning is just
beginning. While in this paper we showed how to adapt a
Boosted Tree algorithm to federated learning settings, much
remains to be done on other machine-learning algorithms in
privacy-preserving and lossless manners. Other encryption
algorithms can be considered as well that ensures the above
properties.
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